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Can Training Programs or Rather Wage Subsidies 
Bring the Unemployed Back to Work? 
A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation for Germany
* 
 
Our paper investigates the relative effects of wage subsidies and further vocational training 
on the subsequent employment prospects of previously unemployed program participants. 
First, we outline a theoretical approach based on a firm’s hiring decision. For the relative 
effectiveness of both labor market programs the assumption concerning the formation of 
human capital is crucial and leads to competing hypotheses for the medium and long term. 
On the assumption that wage subsidies have no effect on human capital they improve 
individuals’ employment prospects less than training programs. Contrariwise, on the 
assumption that the formation of human capital on subsidized jobs equals that by formal 
training subsidization has the same employment effect as a training program. Second, we 
test the two hypotheses empirically, using a large administrative data set from Germany and 
statistical matching techniques. Our treatment groups consist of unemployed persons taking 
up subsidized employment or entering a further vocational training program, respectively, 
during March 2003. To exclude unemployment after program end we estimate the effect of 
keeping a subsidized job versus participating in training and taking up a job immediately 
afterwards. The results strongly support the latter of our competing hypotheses: Previously 
subsidized individuals and trained individuals who found a job immediately afterwards have 
the same employment rates. This leads to the conclusion that firms value training on a 
subsidized job as much as formal training programs. 
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 1 Introduction 
In Germany, considerable funds are devoted to active labor market programs that should 
support the integration of unemployed persons into the labor market. As a rule of 
thumb, the German Federal Employment Agency and the German Federal Government 
expenditures for active labor market programs have equaled around 40 percent of the 
expenditures on passive unemployment benefits and social assistance in past years. 
Thus Wunsch and Lechner (2008) were not the only ones to raise the question “What 
Did All the Money Do?”. During the last decade, a steadily increasing literature on pro-
gram evaluation has evolved. For Germany, a number of microeconometric studies 
based on large process generated data sets estimated the average effects of program par-
ticipation on participants. 
We are interested in particular in wage subsides and further vocational training pro-
grams, using a comparative approach. Recent findings showed that vocational training 
programs for the unemployed and wage subsidies had considerable lock-in effects in the 
short run, but were fairly successful in the long run in bringing participants back to 
regular employment (Lechner et al., 2005; 2007, Fitzenberger et al., 2006, Fitzenberger 
and Völter, 2007, Jaenichen and Stephan, 2009). However, as Caliendo and Steiner 
(2005, 36) explained , “Present studies estimate the success of a certain (labor market) 
program on the basis of statistical models without formulating economic hypothesis 
explicitly”. Therefore, we develop a theoretical framework to compare the expected 
effects of training and wage subsidy programs on the employment prospects of partici-
pants, and test the presumptions of the model empirically. Although Lechner (1999), 
Imbens (1999) and Gerfin and Lechner (2002) extend Rubin’s model to pairwise pro-
gram comparisons, comparative empirical studies of active labor market programs are 
still sparse for Germany. 
In more detail, our paper contributes to the literature by first presenting a theoretical 
approach that discusses the effects of two major active labor market programs – wage 
subsidies and further training programs – on the employment prospects of participants. 
The model draws attention in particular to the role of hiring decisions of firms and to 
the formation of human capital by training programs and by training on subsidized jobs. 
Second, we estimate relative average treatment effects on the differentially treated for 
 
1both programs (and conduct also a comparison with non-participants). To account for 
unemployment after labor market programs we conduct comparisons not only of all 
unemployed but also of unemployed persons taking-up or keeping a job after program 
end (which is new in literature). For this purpose, we use German data to analyze per-
sons who entered one of the programs in March 2003. Outcome variables are cumulated 
days spent in regular employment during the 3.5 years after program’s start and the 
share in regular employment at the end of the observation periods. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework underlying 
our analysis, while Section 3 describes the empirical method data as our findings. Both 
Sections include also a short literature review. Finally, Section 4 summarizes and draws 
some conclusions.  
2 Theoretical  Framework 
2.1 Literature  Review 
Recent theoretical analyses of active labor market programs are either of microeco-
nomic nature or at least micro-founded. One branch of the related literature models la-
bor market imperfections arising from wage setting in an economy (e.g. efficiency mod-
els, insider-outsider models), and deducts quasi-equilibrium unemployment (Snower, 
1994, 1997, Layard, 1997). Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 2003) developed a search- 
and match equilibrium, also taking into account the effects of wage subsidies. Their 
partial model – excluding factor and good markets - has been expanded for instance by 
Boone and van Ours (2004), Cardullo and van der Linden (2006) and Oskamp and 
Snower (2007) to analyze the implications of different active labor market programs, 
like public employment services, wage subsidies and training programs, on unemploy-
ment.  
Calmfors et al. (2002) and Calmfors (1994) conducted a comprehensive analysis of the 
– intended and unintended – effects of active labor market policy by using a modified 
version of the theoretical framework for analyzing equilibrium real wages and unem-
ployment, as laid out by Layard et al. (1991). In their micro-funded framework active 
labor market policy has the following major effects: It improves the matching-process 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, Pissarides, 2000) and increases the productivity of job 
seekers, especially through training programs. It strengthens the competition for avail-
 
2able jobs by augmenting and preserving the skills of unemployed individuals and main-
taining the motivation to actively seek work (Layard et al., 1991, Nickell and Layard, 
1999) and it improves the allocation of the work force from low-productivity sectors to 
expanding high-productivity sectors, especially through training programs and other 
mobility-enhancing programs. However, it may also crowd out regular labor demand, 
and increase the use of subsidized employment. Finally, it may induce additional wage 
pressure, because it increases welfare during unemployment.  
Our theoretical approach applies to the individual hiring decisions of firms and to the 
employment prospects of program participants. With that partial analytic approach we 
can examine the direct implications of active labor market programs, like decreasing 
costs or increasing productivity of employees. We cannot, however, identify indirect 
effects, like dead weight losses and substitution effects or improving the allocation of 
the workforce. The model is in the tradition of Albach (1996), who models firms’ hiring 
decisions by taking into account transaction cost, settling-in and further training costs, 
and dismissal costs and by interpreting hiring as an investment. Sadowski (2002) devel-
ops a similar approach of a firm’s demand of human resources assuming quasi-fixed 
labor costs; Neubäumer (2006) takes into account all costs and revenues of labor con-
tracts. 
2.2  A Firm’s Decision to Hire – or not to Hire 
Building on the theoretical approaches of Albach (1996) and Neubäumer (2006) we 
model a firm’s hiring as an investment decision in the case of quasi-fixed costs per em-
ployee . Assume that the firm maximizes its expected profit; the discount rate is given 
by r. A firm hires a worker, taking into account transaction costs for search and selec-
tion (C0) in period 0 as well as settling-in costs (C1), i.e. the difference between wage 
and marginal productivity (w1 – Q1), in period 1. The marginal productivity in period 1 
and in further periods is determined by a set of characteristics of the firm, the job and 
the employee.  
The present value of a worker (PV) is the result of his net revenues (wi – Qi) in period 2 
thru n. Therefore we are particularly interested in the duration of the employment rela-
tionship. On the one hand firms differ by the number of periods (n) they intend to em-
ploy a worker. n will be lower if a firm requires external flexibility, for instance because 
 
3it is exposed to economic shocks. Furthermore n depends on the need of firm-specific 
human capital for a certain job, i.e. the same firm can have jobs with a high n or jobs 
with a low n. On the other hand the probability that this intended duration can be real-
ized (P) depends on an employee‘s qualification and behavior: He will be dismissed by 
the firm if he performs badly, but he might also quit the job himself.  
A firm’s condition for hiring a particular worker in is given by 
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Including the effects of unemployment 
What are the impacts of unemployment, especially of a longer period of joblessness? 
Unemployment depreciates previously acquired human capital and has an adverse effect 
on workers motivation and self-esteem.  
Therefore we firstly assume that unemployment raises the settling-in costs (w1 – Q1) as 
the marginal productivity in period 1 decreases with the duration of unemployment (u) 
(dQ1/du < 0).
1 Second, we assume that the probability of reaching the intended duration 
of the employment relationship decreases with the duration of unemployment 
(dP/du < 0). Finally, we assume that wages wi are given and do not vary with the previ-
ous duration of unemployment, as many German firms have to pay collective agreed 
wages to union members and voluntarily pay them to non members, as well . In addi-
tion, differentiating wages by unemployment duration might be considered as “unfair”.  
Thus a firm's condition for hiring an unemployed individual is 
    . 0 ) u ( Q w C PV ) u ( P 1 1 0     
 
 ( 2) 
2.3  Hiring Decisions with Active Labor Market Programs 
In the next step we consider the effects of active labor market programs. A wage sub-
sidy is paid to employers during period 1 to compensate for higher settling-in costs if 
they hire a previously unemployed person. A follow-up period of further employment is 
                                                 
1   To keep our model simple we assume that unemployment does not have an effect on the productivity 
of later periods. 
 
4obligatory after the expiration of the subsidy; otherwise the received subsidy has to be 
reimbursed by the firm. If such a settling-in subsidy (s1) is paid, a firm's hiring condition 
r subsidized workers is given by  fo
    . 0 s ) u ( Q w C PV ) u ( P 1 1 1 0      
 
 ( 3) 







  term long to medium : II term short : I
A wage subsidy will thus induce a firm to hire an unemployed individual for a particular 
job (with an associated intended duration of employment) if the wage subsidy covers 
the reduction of productivity in period 1 (I) and the risk induced through the shorter 
expected value of P (II). Therefore we assume that subsidized workers are more often 
hired for jobs that are intended to be short, i.e. for jobs with little need of firm-specific 
human capital and/or in firms requiring a high external flexibility. Even then the wage 
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formerly unemployed person. Thus the hiring condition changes to 
 
1 (I). Hence, even with a subsidy, long-term unemployed often will not find a job. 
Training programs (q) are aimed at maintaining and extending the vocational qualifica-
tions of unemployed and thus can be regarded as a human capital investment. Further-
more, participating in a qualification program and completing it may serve as a signal of 
motivation and endurance. Therefore we assume that training decreases a worker's set-
tling-in cost, raises his marginal productivity in period 2 thru n and increases the prob-
ability of reaching the intended duration of the employment relationship. To simplify 
the model , we assume that training does not have an impact on t

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w ) q ( Q
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Note that all three (positive) effects depend on the quality of the training program (q), 


















    
 ( 5) 
 
5tors and the trainability and motivation of the participants. Furthermore, the firm’s 
valuation of the program quality is important; the firm has to be convinced that the pro-
Training will thus compensate for the adverse effects of unemployment as long as 
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First, a training program reduces the deduction of productivity in period 1 by unem-
ployment (I). This short term effect is particular relevant for jobs intended to end after a 
short employment period. Secondly, training increases the present value and the ex-
pected probabilityof realizing the intended employment duration. This medium to long 
term effect (II) is mo e important for long-term positions . It is po itive in most cases. 
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 P(u, q) / q, but the resulting 
effect also has to compensate for the effect of the higher present value induced by the 
s, the hiring condition 
implies that a firm will prefer a subsidized worker as long as 
 
training. (Very poor training quality could be a reason for this .) 
Finally, comparing subsidized and trained unemployed person
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Our model suggests that firms with high need for external flexibility and/or with jobs 
with low firm-specific human capital prefer subsidized workers as the wage subsidy (s1) 
is usually higher than the productivity effect of the training program during the settling-
in period (positive short term effect I).
2 If n is low, medium and long term effects will 
be small and inconsequential (I > II). Contrariwise, a firm with permanent jobs, e.g. due 
 
2   The productivity effect of the training in period 1 is limited as a low productivity during settling-in 
results not only from a low motivation and trainability of further unemployed but also from his lack of 
firm-specific human capital. 
 
6to high firm-specific human capital and minor external fluctuations, will prefer hiring 
participants in training programs as the additional present value and the higher probabil-
ity to realize this present v ct (II > I). 
t ap-
 an (otherwise similar) 
unemployed with training and search unemployment as long as 
 
alue will over-ride the short term effe
Including search unemployment  
Nearly all subsidized workers are further employed after the subsidization period due to 
the obligatory follow-up period, while participants of training programs often have a 
period of search unemployment (uS) after program end. We assume that the human capi-
tal gained by training is depreciated to qS if followed by search unemployment as a part 
of the human capital will be lost, if the newly won knowledge and abilities are no
plied and strengthened and the renewed unemployment has a demoralizing effect. 
Thus a firm will prefer an unemployed with a wage subsidy to
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 long term effect of training will not ex-
1)  etter employment prospects than participants of 
2) 
ployment prospects than recipients of wage subsidies in the medium- 
  egree if participants of training pro-
grams with search unemployment are included.) 
Now, a firm with jobs intended to be short term will prefer workers with wage subsidies 
even more (I >> II). For a firm with permanent jobs qS is crucial, i.e. how much the hu-
man capital won by training is depreciated by search unemployment. If qS has become 
small and hence the additional present value and the higher probability to realize this 
present value is small, the positive medium and
ceed the short term effect of a subsidy (II < I). 
Against that theoretical background we formulate the following hypotheses: 
Recipients of wage subsidies have b
training programs, in the short run,  
Participants of training programs whofind a job immediately after the program ends 
have better em
to long-term.   
(The second hypothesis might apply in a minor d
 
72.4. Another Story 
In our previous model the human capital of formerly unemployed people is developed 
by formal training only. However , we now assume that learning by doing, i.e. training 
on a (subsidized) job, leads to more knowledge and ability . The amount of human capi-
tal gained depends on the quality of the on the job training (qtoj). 
First, we assume that the additional human capital increases the productivity in periods 
2 to n and hence the (expected) present value (PVtoj). Secondly, we assume that the on 
the job training increases the probability of realizing the intended duration of employ-
ment by the same amount as a training program ( P(u, qtoj)  / qtoj = P(u, q)  / q).  
Thus a firm will now prefer to hire an unemployed individual with a wage subsidy to an 
otherwise similar unemployed with training (and without search unemployment) as long 
as  
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 This leaves the short term effect (I) unchanged whereas the medium- to long-term ef-
fect depends on the firms' valuation of the quality of the two training schemes:  
–  If firms expect, that the quality of the on the job training is comparable to the quality 
of the formal training, the medium- to long-term effect (II) turns to zero. Therefore, it 
is likely that firms do not prefer participants of training programs to recipients of 
wage subsidies for permanent jobs. Subsidized workers do not have a higher risk of 
dismissal.  
–  If firms value the quality of the formal training much higher than the quality of the 
on the job training, the medium to long term effect (II) is negative and firms with 
permanent jobs will prefer to hire participants of training programs. (The result is 
approximately the same as if we do not include the effects of on the job training in 
our model.) 
The assumption of training on subsidized jobs has to be tested empirically. Therefore 
we have to add a competing hypothesis and will test the following hypotheses: 
 
81) Recipients of wage subsidies have better employment prospects than participants of 
training programs, in the short run,  
2) Participants of training programs who find a job immediately after the program ends 
have better employment prospects than recipients of wage subsidies, medium- to 
long-term.  
against 
3) Recipients of wage subsidies have the same (or even better) employment prospects 
as participants of training programs who find a job immediately after the program 
end, medium- to long-term. 
(If we include program participants with unemployment the advance of participants in 
training will be lower (hypothesis 2) or recipients of wage subsidies have better em-
ployment prospects than participants in training (hypothesis 3).) 
3 Empirical  Evidence 
3.1 Literature  Review 
In Germany, participation in further vocational training programs seems to increase em-
ployment prospects in the long-term, while medium-term results are ambiguous . 
Lechner et al. (2005, 2007), Fitzenberger et al. (2006) and Fitzenberger and Völter 
(2007) analyzed the long-run effects up to seven years after program entry, focusing 
mainly on unemployment entries in 1993/94. In the long run, they generally found posi-
tive effects of further vocational training. However, because program effects are rather 
weak and participants search for employment less during training (lock-in effect) it may 
take some time until the estimated effect turns positive. For program entries during the 
years 2000 to 2002 and medium-term effects around 2 to 2.5 years the evidence is 
mixed: Rinne et al. (2007) obtained middle-term positive effects of program participa-
tion on the employment possibilities in all subgroups investigated. Biewen et al. (2007) 
found positive short- and medium-term effects on employment rates of participants for 
programs in West Germany (but not in East Germany) and particular groups of unem-
ployed. Wunsch and Lechner (2008) as well as Lechner and Wunsch (2006) estimated 
 
9that further vocational training had mostly negative or insignificant effects on employ-
ment rates of participants.  
A large number of studies have estimated the impact of targeted wage subsidies on the 
employment prospects of participants, compared to unemployed non-participants. Most 
authors constructed comparison groups of similar, but non-subsidized individuals using 
statistical matching techniques and non-experimental data. For Germany, Jaenichen 
(2002, 2005) and Jaenichen and Stephan (2009) used this approach and showed that 
participants in different types of targeted wage subsidy schemes subsequently much 
higher employment rates than similar unemployed persons, who did not take up a subsi-
dized job. In West Germany, Ruppe (2009) found that subsidies decreased the risk of 
ending an employment relationship considerably, resulting in higher survival rates and 
longer tenure of previously subsidized employment relationships.
3 Evidence for Britain 
(Dorsett 2001) and Sweden (Sianesi 2008, Carling and Richardson 2004, Fredriksson 
and Johansson 2004, Forslund et al. 2004) suggested that wage subsidies had a positive 
effect on employment probabilities of the participants. Turning to the few results from 
social experiments on subsidy vouchers, Burtless (1985) found that unemployed persons 
with a voucher were less likely to find employment than job-seekers without vouchers. 
However, Dubin and Rivers (1993) obtained an increased probability of reemployment 
for the treated groups, when taking into account self-selection forvoucher usage.  
Boockmann et al. (2007) investigated the effects changes in the legislation regarding 
German wage subsidies and concluded that increases in subsidized employment were 
mostly absorbed by deadweight losses. Hartmann (2004) conducted a comprehensive 
study of the hiring behavior of firms. Thereby he tried to estimate the amount of dead-
weight loss by asking firms if they would have hired the same person without the sup-
port of a subsidy. For the program under consideration in our study, firms answered that 
around 40 to 60 percent of subsidized persons would have been hired anyway without 
the help of the subsidy (p. 93). These results are in line with findings of the implementa-
tion study from a survey of 34 firms, presented in ZEW et al. (2005, p. 140 ff.).  
                                                 
3   That supports our assumption of training on subsidized jobs causing the result that firms do not prefer 
participants of training programs to recipients of wage subsidies for permanent jobs. 
 
10Comparisons across participants in further vocational training and unemployed taking 
up a subsidized job have not been presented for Germany yet. For Great Britain, Dorsett 
(2001) contrasted entries into subsidized employment, full-time education and training, 
an environmental task force or a voluntary sector that were different options within the 
New Deal Program for Young People. His main finding was that wage subsidies domi-
nated all other options. For Switzerland, Gerfin and Lechner (2002) compared participa-
tion in nine different programs. They showed that temporary wage subsidies paid to 
employees – paid in order to compensate income-losses in comparison to former times 
of employment – has been most efficient in integrating participants into regular em-
ployment. Gerfin et al. (2004) contrasted employment programs in non-profit organiza-
tions and temporary wage subsidies; again the latter were more effective. For Sweden, 
Sianesi (2008) compared participation in six major programs. Employment subsidies 
performed best by far; they were followed by trainee replacement and labor market trai-
ning. Sianesi (2008) summarizes as a main result of many micro studies that the more a 
program resembles regular employment in the competitive sector, the more it will bene-
fit its participants. 
Jaenichen and Stephan (2009) point out that regarding wage subsidies, an argument 
against the matching approach might be that not solely labor market outcomes after re-
ceiving a subsidy are observed, but rather outcomes of a subsidy in combination with a 
job offer. Hence the result that unemployed taking up a subsidized job have better labor 
market prospects than participants of training programs could be due to the fact that 
some of the latter suffer from search unemployed after program end. Therefore we do 
the comparisons not only of all participants of the two programs but also of participants 
who are employed after program end. That type pf comparison has not been conducted 
before either.  
3.2 Empirical  Approach 
We want to estimate the average effects on the labor market outcomes of the differen-
tially treated (ATDT). The underlying idea is based on the potential outcomes model 
(Rubin, 1974) that has been extended by Imbens (1999) and Lechner (1999) to multiple 
states: An individual can potentially be in different states, while the outcome variable of 
interest may differ between these states. In our analysis the different states will be no 
 
11program entry, an entry into subsidized employment or an entry in a training program 
during March 2003. Because we cannot observe the average counterfactual outcome 
that members of one group would have had, if they had received a different treatment 
instead, we have to find an adequate comparison group to attribute this counterfactual 
outcome. We assume that the value of the outcome variables for each person is not in-
fluenced by the actual participation of other persons (Stable Unit Treatment Value As-
sumption).  
With non-experimental data, statistical matching techniques might be applied to find 
such a comparison group. The method has to take into account that assignment to a par-
ticular program, e.g. a qualification program, is no random event. In particular those 
individuals who expect to benefit most from training may enter the program. The identi-
fying assumption of statistical matching is that no unobserved heterogeneity correlated 
with the selection into (particular) programs and with outcome variables remaining after 
accounting for a set of observable variables X, which determine the participation deci-
sion as well as the expected success of a program. An estimate of the counterfactual 
outcome – for instance the outcome participants in training programs would have had 
after treatment with a wage subsidy – can then be based on individuals with similar ob-
servable characteristics X who in fact received a wage subsidy. In other words: Depend-
ing on X, the outcome after participation in a particular program should not depend on 
the decision to join this program (Conditional Independence Assumption). However, the 
comparison can only be conducted for individuals who have – conditional on the vari-
able vector X – a positive probability to be in each of both programs (Common Support 
Condition). 
Against the background of our theoretical approach and the resulting hypotheses we 
estimate two scenarios, with different counterfactual situations: First, we estimate the 
effect of taking up a subsidized job versus participating in training and taking up a job 
afterwards (and also versus taking up non-subsidized employment). Second, we esti-
mate the effect of taking up a subsidized job versus joining a training program with and 
without unemployment afterwards (and also versus remaining unemployed).  
We choose comparison groups by means of propensity score matching. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) have shown that it is sufficient to match on the propensity score – the 
probability to join a program – to obtain the same probability distribution for treated 
 
12and non-treated individuals. This is a useful simplification, since exact matching on a 
high-dimensional vector of X-variables would become a complex task. Similar proper-
ties hold true in a multiple treatment framework as well (Lechner, 1999). We estimate 
propensity scores using a probit model for each combination analyzed. Comparison 
group members are then chosen by radius matching (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) with a 
caliper of 0.005: Participants are matched with “synthetic comparison persons”, com-
posed of a weighted equivalent of all persons falling within a radius of 0.005 their pro-
pensity score. The program impact is then estimated as the mean difference in the 
weighted outcomes of both groups. All estimates are performed using the STATA-
module psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). Note that variance estimates for esti-
mated treatment effects neglect that the propensity score itself has been estimated 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2006).  
To test for the quality of the matching, we compute the mean standardized bias (MSB) 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) between each treated group and its matched comparison 
group across all variables of X. A lower value of the MSB indicates more similarity 
between the two groups. While no clear theoretical indication exists as to which remain-
ing bias might be acceptable, Caliendo and Hujer (2005) summarize as a rule of thumb 
that most studies assess a reduction of the MSB after matching to 3 or 5 percent as suf-
ficient. Black and Smith (2004) draw attention to the importance of common support. 
To analyze common support, we conduct two analyses. First, we compute the shares of 
individuals in the treatment and in the support group within common support. Second, 
we compute maximum weights to get an impression how heavily observations are util-
ized in constructing the counterfactuals. Finally, by conducting a Rosenbaum-bounds 
analysis we analyze how sensitive the estimated treatment effects are to a violation of 
the Conditional Independence Assumption. This analysis shows how strongly unob-
served heterogeneity would have to influence the odds of differential assignment due to 
unobserved factors to undermine the results of the matching analysis. For this purpose 
we apply the stata module mhbounds (Becker and Caliendo, 2007) – used for nearest 
neighbor matching without replacement – to compute the Mantel-Haenszel statistics for 
the share in regular employment at the end of the observation period. 
 
133.3  Data and Variables 
Our empirical analysis is based on the TrEffeR-data set (Stephan et al., 2006). This ad-
ministrative data set has been constructed for the monitoring purposes of the German 
Public Employment Service. While the TrEffeR data set is not available for public use, 
it is composed of the same data flows as the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) 
of the Institute for Employment Research (Hummel et al., 2005). The version utilized 
here merges data flows from the distinct computer based operative systems of the Public 
Employment Service on periods of registered job search, registered unemployment, par-
ticipation in labor market programs and employment for the period from 2000 to 2007. 
Our complete sample covered all program entries during March 2003 as well as a ran-
dom 10-percent-sample of the unemployment stock during this month. For our analysis, 
we restrict the sample to West Germany and to individuals of age 25 to 54 who were 
unemployed for no longer than one year in March 2003 and have not entered a program 
until this time during their current unemployment spell.  
For the ease of exposition we concentrate on individuals entering one of two program 
variants during March 2003, which can be seen as most closely matched to our theoreti-
cal approach and include only participants with a completed duration of up to 6 months: 
First, we analyze a variant of wage subsidies that compensates firms for settling-in 
costs
4. These subsidies are paid for a limited time period to employers hiring an unem-
ployed person, to compensate for special training requirements at the workplace. Case 
managers in local employment agencies have latitude in the allowance decision as well 
as in the fixing of the amount (up to 30 percent of the monthly wage) and duration of 
the subsidy (at most 6 months). A follow-up period of further employment has been 
obligatory after the expiration of the subsidy. If a person is dismissed during subsidiza-
tion or within this period, under specific conditions the employer could be asked to re-
imburse part of the subsidy. As has already been mentioned, the selection process of 
this scheme is driven by the fact that it requires consent of the unemployed person, the 
caseworker and the firm. Second, we investigate participants in further vocational train-
ing programs aimed at the provision of specific vocational skills, which may include 
                                                 
4   “Einarbeitungszuschuss bei Einarbeitung”. 
 
14occupation-related training and general training.
5 Direct training costs are covered by 
the Public Employment Service; furthermore, participants receive a subsistence allow-
ance that usually equals the unemployment compensation. Since 2003 access to such 
further training programs is granted through training vouchers. Selection into training 
thus requires consent of the unemployed person, the caseworker as well as the training 
provider. 
We estimate different program effects on participants using two outcome variables in 
each case. We compute i) cumulated days spent in regular employment during the 3.5 
years after the program start in March 2003 and ii) shares in regular employment 3.5 
years after the program start. In computing these outcome variables, times of subsidized 
employment and training are not interpreted as a “success”, which results in a lock-in 
effect of programs. Our group of non-participants did not enter any program during 
March 2003, but might do so later, to avoid to condition on successful future outcomes 
(Sianesi 2008, Fredriksson and Johansson 2004). Outcome variables for non-
participants are measured from March 15, 2003, and all individuals who had already left 
unemployment at this date were excluded from the sample.  
Our model highlights in particular the importance of personal characteristics as educa-
tion that will have an impact on an individual’s productivity. In our estimates we ac-
count for a large number of variables that should be crucial for selection into programs 
as well as on labor market outcomes. Heckman and Smith (1999) show that it is impor-
tant to account for the labor market history of individuals, while Heckman et al. (1999) 
demonstrate the relevance of regional labor market information. In particular, we in-
clude the following variables (all categorized as dummy variables): a) Socio-
demographic characteristics, measured at the start of an unemployment spell: Age, 
marital status, nationality, education, degree of disability. b) Information on the kind of 
benefit receipt. c) Unemployment duration in current spell: Months before program en-
try in March 2003 for participants and months before March 15, 2003 for “waiting” 
non-participants. d) Employment-history in the two years preceding the analyzed unem-
ployment spell, measured at the start of the unemployment spell: Former unemploy-
                                                 
5   “Berufsbezogene übergreifende Weiterbildung, berufspraktische Weiterbildung oder berufliche Auf-
stiegsweiterbildung”. 
 
15ment, participation in labor market programs, sanctions and periods of illness. e) Re-
gional labor market situation: Performance cluster of the regional labor market (Blien et 
al., 2004). 
For our comparison of subsidized workers with individuals who took up a job immedi-
ately after training, we restrict the analysis to program participants who were employed 
at least one day within one month after the end of the program. (Also, we compare both 
groups of program participants who found employment with "waiting" individuals who 
found a job within one month after March 15.) 
3.4 Empirical  Findings 
Mean values of the explaining variables before matching are displayed in Table 1. 
While our analysis includes around 800 persons entering subsidized employment, we 
observe nearly 2,200 entries in training programs. The group of unemployed individuals 
not entering a program in March 2003 comprises around 130,000 persons. Table 1 
shows that recipients of wage subsidies differ in fact from participants of training pro-
grams. They seem to be a “more positive selection” of program participants: They are 
younger than the average participant of a training program, have better qualifications, 
especially at a medium level, often receive more unemployment benefits, had less peri-
ods of sickness and have a shorter duration of unemployment.  
Nine tenths of the recipients of wage subsidies, a quarter of participants of the training 
programs and every seventh "waiting" non-participant was employed within one month 
of the program’s end, or after March 15, respectively. Subsidized and trained individu-
als who entered regular employment immediately after program participation are much 
more similar. They differ only – but by a smaller margin – regarding gender, vocational 
training and receipt of unemployment benefits. Also the characteristics of program par-
ticipants and "waiting" individuals differ less. Nevertheless, in the latter group the per-
centage of older people, foreigners, and less qualified individual is still higher and the 
percentage of people unemployed up to 6 month is lower.  
The results of our matching analysis of the two labor market programs are displayed in 
Table 2 and in Figure 1 and 2. Note that the average treatment effects of the differen-
tially treated, the ATDTs, are asymmetric, because participants in different programs 
differ in their characteristics. 
 
16Following up our hypotheses, we start with the results for program participants (and 
former unemployed) who keep or take up a job after the program ends (see "conditional 
on employment" in Table 2 and Figure 1). Comparing the effects of the two labor mar-
ket programs, we find no significant differences in the employment prospects of partici-
pants in the wage subsidy and the training scheme; all ATDTs are insignificant. Figure 
1 shows that subsidized workers have an advantage directly after the end of the pro-
gram, but participants of training programs catch up after around 1.5 years. Medium-
term, both participant groups have nearly the same shares in regular employment.  
These results strongly support our third hypothesis: Medium-term, recipients of wage 
subsidies have the same employment prospects as participants of training programs who 
find a job immediately after program end. This speaks for the assumption, that the for-
mation of human capital by training on subsidized jobs is as high as the gain of human 
capital by formal training programs. Furthermore the results support our first hypothe-
sis, that in the short run, recipients of wage subsidies have better employment prospects 
than participants of training programs. 
The ATDTs of program participants relative to "waiting" individuals are slightly nega-
tive, in the short run (see Figure 1). This finding results from the fact that non-
participants do not suffer from a lock-in effect. But program participants have slightly, 
but significant higher shares in regular employment after 3.5 years (about 6 percentage 
points). Furthermore, Figure 1 reveals that, in particular previously subsidized workers, 
but also previously trained workers, experience more stable employment relationships. 
Obviously, previous non-participants are more subject to seasonal unemployment. (This 
corresponds with the results of Hartmann (2004) showing that flexibility requirements 
deter firms from using subsidies and lead them to hire marginal or part-time employees 
instead.) 
Without conditioning on employment, participants in the wage subsidy scheme are em-
ployed more often and for longer than participants in training programs: The majority of 
ATDTs is significantly different from zero (see Table 2). The main reason is that recipi-
ents of wage subsidies convey a relative advantage in terms of employment probabili-
ties after programs have expired as their employment relationships usually do not end 
immediately after the expiration of the wage subsidy. 80 percent of subsidized jobs 
 
17“survive” the period of subsidization and the follow-up period. In contrast, participants 
of training programs have to search for a new job during or after training (see Figure 2) 
and many of them have a period of search unemployment. Therefore recipients of wage 
subsidies have been in regular employment around 300 days more than similar partici-
pants of training programs during a period of 3.5 years. At the end of the observation 
period the difference in shares in regular employment still amounts to 16 percentage 
points. These results support the assumption that human capital can be gained by train-
ing on subsidized jobs as well as by formal training programs. Furthermore it becomes 
apparent that conditioning on employment is necessary to test the two competing hy-
potheses.  
Finally, if we include individuals unemployed after program end, participants in both 
programs fare far better than non-participants (Table 2): After 3.5 years the share of 
subsidized individuals in regular employment is 27 percentage points higher than that of 
individuals in the state of "waiting"; for trained individuals the difference amounts to 12 
percentage points. Furthermore, participants in both programs have spent more days in 
regular employment during the 3.5 years after program entry than non-participants. The 
effect is, again, remarkably larger for wage subsidy recipients (nearly 400 days) than for 
training participants (nearly 100 days). 
Table 3 summarizes information on matching quality, features of common support and 
the possible importance of unobserved heterogeneity. When taken altogether, the statis-
tics presented provide some confidence in the results of the matching analysis: First, the 
mean standardized bias (MSB) is considerably reduced after matching, to 1.9 or 1.8, 
respectively, for differentially treated conditional on taking up employment and to 0.7 
or 1.7 percent, respectively, for the full sample of differentially treated. The MSB is 
even lower for comparisons comprising non-participants. Second, the share of observa-
tions in common support never falls below 95 percent of treatment and comparison 
group members, which implies that our results refer to the majority of program mem-
bers and that the majority of treatment group members have been taken into account 
when estimating counterfactual outcomes. By far the largest difference of an observa-
tion in the comparison group is found when estimating the relative effect of training 
compared to subsidization of similar persons, and amounts to 29. Regarding caseloads 
underlying our analysis (Table 1) this seems to be acceptable. Third, for estimated 
 
18treatment effects on shares in regular employment at the end of the observation period, 
the last column shows how strongly unobserved heterogeneity would have to influence 
the odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors to undermine the results of 
the matching analysis. For instance, to obtain insignificant or even negative treatment 
effects of participation in subsidized employment compared to training for the full sam-
ple, the impact of unobserved heterogeneity would have to increase the relative prob-
ability to obtain a subsidy by 110 percent. 
4 Conclusions 
What did all the money do that has been spent on active labor market programs in Ger-
many? While the literature on program effectiveness has been steadily increasing, rela-
tively few cross-program comparisons have been conducted for Germany yet, in par-
ticular none including wage subsidies. Furthermore previous comparisons did not ex-
clude search unemployment, respectively did not condition on employment after pro-
gram end.  
Our paper presented first a theoretical approach based on a firm’s hiring decision for 
comparing the effects of training programs and wage subsidies for the employment 
prospects of individuals. It led to the well-defined hypothesis that, in the short run, re-
cipients of wage subsidies have higher employment rates than participants of training 
programs. In contrast, in the middle- to long-term the assumptions concerning the for-
mation of human capital were crucial for the resulting hypotheses. On the assumption 
that wage subsidies have no effect on human capital they improve individuals' employ-
ment prospects less than training programs. However, on the assumption that the forma-
tion of human capital on subsidized jobs equals that by formal training subsidization has 
the same employment effect as a training program. 
Second, we utilized process generated German data to test the theoretically deduced 
hypotheses empirically, i.e. we compared the effectiveness of participation in a wage 
subsidy scheme and a training program. Thereby we estimated with two different popu-
lations. As a start, we only allowed for individuals who kept a subsidized job or partici-
pated in training and took up a job immediately afterwards, i.e. we excluded (search) 
unemployment after end of program – which was new in literature. Afterwards, we used 
 
19the whole sample and thus included unemployment after end of program – which was 
the usual procedure in literature. 
In the short run subsidized individuals had higher employment rates than trained ones 
even if (search) unemployment after program end was excluded. (Both groups were – 
after an initial lock-in period – more employed than non participants). This result is in 
line with our hypothesis for the short term. 3.5 years after program entry previously 
subsidized individuals and trained individuals who found a job immediately afterwards 
had nearly the same employment rates and the same number of cumulated days in em-
ployment (no significant ATDTs). That strongly supported the second of our competing 
middle-term hypotheses and led to the conclusion that firms value training on a subsi-
dized job as much as formal training programs.  
When we included unemployment after program end, subsidized individuals had sig-
nificant higher employment rates than trained individuals in the short-term and after 3.5 
years. (Furthermore employment rates of subsidized and trained workers were always 
higher than those of non-participants, who were especially subject to seasonal unem-
ployment.) 
Finally, it must be recalled that we could not identify the indirect effects of the different 
programs – neither with our model nor with our empirical results. As Layard et al. 
(1991, 481) emphasize, for a judgment of the welfare costs of a program much more has 
to be taken into account than simply employment rates: Beneath the program costs and 
the employment effects at the macro level, output benefits, psychic benefits and social 
costs, as well as the distributional incidence of active labor market programs have to be 
considered. They argue that important benefits from training are (hopefully) lifetime 
productivity gains for those trained and – because unemployment is one of the major 
sources in inequality in modern societies – the major distributional gain from any reduc-
tion in unemployment. 
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 Appendix 
Table 1: Variable means of selected attributes (0 = no, 1 = yes) before matching  
 
 
Variables Subsidy  Training  "Waiting" 
 
 
   All  Employed
# All  Employed
#  All  Employed
#
Female  0.34 0.33 0.44 0.38 0.41 0.32 
Age  25-29  0.21 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18 
Age  30-34  0.21 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20 
Age  35-39  0.25 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.21 
Age  40-44  0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Age  45-49  0.11 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.13 
Age  50-54  0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.11 
Health  problems  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.05 
Slightly  disabeled  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Severly  disabeled  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Married  0.49 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.53 
Married and female  0.17  0.17  0.24  0.19  0.24  0.17 
Foreigner  0.09 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.14 
Without secondary degree  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.15  0.11 
Secondary degree (Hauptschule)  0.46 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.58 
Secondary degree (Realschule)  0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.18 
Secondary  degree  (Gymnasium)  0.19 0.19 0.22 0.18 0.14 0.12 
Without vocational training  0.19  0.19  0.26  0.24  0.39  0.32 
Vocational  training  0.74 0.74 0.64 0.67 0.54 0.62 
University  degree  0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 
Unemployment benefit receipt 0.71  0.71  0.62  0.67 0.50 0.66 































No benefit receipt  0.24 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.29 
Unemployed up to 1 month  0.60  0.61  0.59  0.63  0.46  0.49 
Unemployed  1-6  months  0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.30 
Unemployed  7-12  months  0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.21 
Unemployed  13-18  months  0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.05 
Unemployed  19-24  months  0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.02 
Labor  market  programme  0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.12 




















Sanctions  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 
1st month of unemployment  0.13  0.13  0.09  0.09  0.13  0.14 
2nd month of unemployment  0.14  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.15 
3rd month of unemployment  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.17  0.16  0.26 
4th month of unemployment  0.13  0.13  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.16 
5th month of unemployment  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.09 
6th month of unemployment  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.08  0.06 
7th month of unemployment  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.03 
8th month of unemployment  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.03 
9th month of unemployment  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.03 
10th month of unemployment  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.02 





























12th month of unemployment  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.02 
Urban area, high unemployment  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.11  0.13  0.08 
Urban  area,  medium  unemployment  0.21 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.11 
Above average unemp., moderate dynamics 0.11  0.11  0.09  0.10  0.09  0.11 
Rural area, average unemployment  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.08 
Rural area, below average unemployment  0.22  0.23  0.17  0.16  0.18  0.18 
Center, good situation and high dynamics  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.12  0.10 
Rural area, good situation and high dynam- 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.10 



























Very good situation  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.07  0.11 
 
  Mean programme duration  105  108  116  109  -  - 
 
  Observations 781  709  2,071  520  124,510  17,796 
#) Program participants that were employed one month after program end and “waiting” non-participants 
employed within one month after March 15, 2003.  
Notes: Entries in subsidized employment (subsidy for training purposes) or further vocational training 
aimed at the provision of skills during March 2003. Only participants in programs with completed dura-
tion of up to 6 months.  
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
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 Table 2: Average outcomes of treatment group T and matched comparison group C and 
average estimated treatment effects on the differentially treated (ATDT) of 
participation in program T instead of program C, 3.5 years after program start 
     
Conditional on  
employment
# Full  sample 
Average  
outcome  ATDT of T 
Average  
outcome  ATDT of T  Treatment 
group (T) 
Comparison 
group (C)  T C  relative  to  C T C  relative  to  C
Cumulated days                         
Training 878 866 11    844 544 300 ** 
Subsidy 
"Waiting" 879 848 31 *  844 459 385 ** 
Subsidy 853 869 -16    491 816  -326 ** 
Training 
"Waiting" 852 846 6    484 394  90 ** 
Employment share                       
Training 0.73 0.73 0.00    0.71 0.56 0.16 ** 
Subsidy 
"Waiting" 0.73 0.67 0.06 **  0.71 0.45 0.27 ** 
Subsidy 0.71 0.71 0.00    0.51 0.67  -0.16 ** 
Training 
"Waiting" 0.71 0.66 0.05 *  0.50 0.39 0.12 ** 
*)  = 0.05. **)  = 0.01. 
#) Program participants that were employed one month after program end and “waiting” non-participants 
employed within one month after March 15, 2003.  
Notes: Entries in subsidized employment (subsidy for training purposes) or further vocational training 
aimed at the provision of skills during March 2003. Only participants in programs with completed dura-
tion of up to 6 months.  
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  Table 3:  Mean standardized bias (MSB) before and after matching, share in common 
support, largest weights in comparison group and significant odd ratios from 
Rosenbaum bounds analysis (RBA)  








#              
Training 5.66 1.92 0.96 0.95 6.0  -- Subsidy 
"Waiting" 12.67 0.98 0.99 0.95 1.6  (+)  1.2
Subsidy 5.66 1.83 0.95 0.96 4.5  -- Training 
"Waiting" 10.69 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.0  (+)  1.1
Full sample                    
Training 8.57 0.74 1.00 0.96 2.5  (+)  2.1 Subsidy 
"Waiting" 13.30 0.41 1.00 1.00 0.3  (+)  4.0
Subsidy 8.57 1.68 0.96 1.00 29.0  (-)  2.1 Training 
"Waiting" 8.77 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.7  (+)  1.8
#) Program participants that were employed one month after program end and “waiting” non-participants 
employed within one month after March 15, 2003. 
Notes: Entries in subsidized employment (subsidy for training purposes) or further vocational training 
aimed at the provision of skills during March 2003. Only participants in programs with completed dura-
tion of up to 6 months. Odds have been calculated for shares in regular employment 3.5 years after pro-
gram entry. 
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
 
2Figure 1:  Only persons employed during one month after program start: Average 
outcomes of treatment group T and matched comparison group C and av-
erage estimated treatment effects on the differentially treated (ATDT) of 
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Days since entry into program
 
Notes: Entries in subsidized employment (subsidy for training purposes) or further vocational training 
aimed at the provision of skills during March 2003. Only participants in programs with completed dura-
tion of up to 6 months. For comparisons comprising subsidized employment, estimates should be inter-
preted as an upper bound on the effectiveness of wage subsidies. 
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. 
 
 
3Figure 2:  Full sample: Average outcomes of treatment group T and matched com-
parison group C and average estimated treatment effects on the differen-
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Days since entry into program
 
Notes: Entries in subsidized employment (subsidy for training purposes) or further vocational training 
aimed at the provision of skills during March 2003. Only participants in programs with completed dura-
tion of up to 6 months. For comparisons comprising subsidized employment, estimates should be inter-
preted as an upper bound on the effectiveness of wage subsidies 
Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.  
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